World leaders and citizens alike use a mix of traditional (e.g. newspapers, magazines, radio, and television) and social (e.g. Twitter, and Facebook) media to redefine community in the digital age. Nations confront challenges from collectives that are asserting their voices into national and regional issues. This dynamic change is made possible by modern digital technologies that allow citizens to use a variety of media to find each other, gain social support, and articulate alternative agendas easier than at any time in history. This article, however, argues that traditional media still provide the main national agenda. But that agenda is supplemented, and in some cases even challenged, by alternative agendas persistently offered via social media. The Arab Spring is an example of how alternative agendas challenged the national agenda. This article presents the Agenda Community Attraction formula for measuring the traditional, social and personal agenda correlations. Given the changing dynamic between national and alternative agendas, social systems confront new challenges and opportunities -mainly the need to balance traditional national values with the need to allow a gradual social agenda to enrich individuals. This allows a national evolution that sensitizes and benefits national organizations. The result is gravitation toward a balance between the power of vertical, institutional society, represented by the Pyramid, and the ease and convenience of social media to convey information, such as mobile Papyrus paper allowed. This mixing of vertical power and horizontal challenge is creating a newer form of national organization, the emerging Digital Society. This new society requires more tolerance between leaders and citizens than at any time in history. Communication plays a major role, but not the only one, in this evolution, or revolution, as the case may be.
Agenda Communities
This article, drawing on the literature of agendasetting scholarship, assesses the influence of both traditional and social media on audiences. It turns out that audiences are using both "types" of media to form pictures of civic life and their own personal agenda communities. This is an age when the digitization of information is allowing information to escape the powerful force of the Nile and flow in small streams into the rich countryside. Of course, this a metaphor but it would make a difference in Egypt, not just in Cairo. In fact, it is making a difference everywhere, not just in the Middle East.
Journalists and agenda setting scholars have long understood there is a relationship between what media say on a daily-or even minute-by-minute-basis and the mental pictures of civic life absorbed by citizens. We assume that there is a relationship, that media tell us what to think about, as argued by American political scientist Bernard Cohen (Cohen, 1963) . In the past four decades we have extended the observations that journalist Walter Lippmann made in his book, Public Opinion (Lippmann, 1946 (Lippmann, , originally published in 1922 . Lippmann pointed out that we necessarily depend on mediated communication to learn about modern, urban society. Lippmann likened press coverage to the spotlights on a stage, shifting from character to character, from event to event. Modern communication scholars have come to call this the agenda setting function of media.
Like Lippmann, we have used content analysis to trace the changing topics, and like Cohen we have concluded that the press does tell us what to think about. But that is not the end of the story. Media do not alter our deep-seated attitudes easily and certainly not our personal values. The press-now a wide range of media, including social media-do define civic life for us. Agenda setting studies have found this true for many national systems, cultures, and political systems. There are more than 500 published studies of media agenda setting, a number of books, and thousands of excellent scholarly papers, including those done in Jordan (McCombs, 2014 , , Mousa, 1992 , 2010 . Putting these studies together allows us to draw some conclusions about the relationships between media and the larger society. As traditional/vertical media decline in circulation and reach, there is a natural loss of authority of the leaders of political and social structures, and a gain in power and sense of community among citizens using social media to create new bonds of connection.
So leaders and followers have to forge a new relationship with each other. We call this the emerging Digital Society. It poses challenges for all of us.
We are often surprised at the limits of media power. For example, the late Dr. Robert L. Stevenson, a UNC-CH international scholar, often pointed out that citizens living in East Germany before the Wall came down watched Western television and when freedom came they still found it difficult to adjust to the values of the capitalist West. In fact, decades later Germany is still working on the transition of older citizens to new ways of living and working. Younger East Germans found it much easier, emphasizing that relating to media agendas is constantly changing and that as the media world reinvents itself, audiences are adjusting, but at very different speeds. The German example is a world example. Older generations everywhere are like East Germans, dealing with a constantly evolving media world and therefore media agenda world. In this, the entire world is alike.
Once we thought that modernization could be accomplished by introducing modern media into different cultural contexts, with modern images of the dynamic economic, social, and political activities going on around the world. An example of this is Daniel Lerner's The Passing of Traditional Society (Lerner, 1958) . We thought that modernization could be accomplished within the minds of citizens in developing countries. But it proved more difficult, as in East Germany, and we can see that our media habits are learned as we become socialized into our own cultures; we stick to what we know. Robert Putnam's book on social capital is a fascinating look at our willingness to contribute to the social good. But what is striking about this book is a topic scarcely mentioned in the text, but evident in some tables (Putnam, 2000) . We stick to our original media with some incremental change throughout our lives. The tables reveal media change across societies, and that is true, but really because older generations, with their use of a particular medium, are dying off. Societies are changing, but individuals are not particularly changing. This is true in the United States with the decline in circulation-since the 1920s in the United States-of daily newspapers (and many print media generally). Every day members of daily newspaper audiences die and are not replaced by a younger audience. In the United States, young people do not read newspapers, and few of them watch the evening television news programs any longer (Kohut, Doherty, Dimock, & Keeter, 2012) .
We sometimes attribute too much power to social media. In the 2010 Arab Spring, Mohamed Bouazizi, a frustrated merchant in Tunisia, set himself on fire, making a record of it. In Egypt, You Tube provided a way to illustrate the tragic death while Twitter enabled organizers to bring thousands of people to Tahrir Square in Cairo, and elsewhere in the region. There were also demonstrations in Jordan and other parts of the Middle East and Northern Africa. These communication modalities can be traced in the emerging spring so clearly that we forget that the social media of change would not have been possible without ongoing tension with then-president Hosni Mubarak and his government. Eventually, regular media were involved with news and comment about political and social change. Jordan Spring of 1989 is an excellent example as it evolved before the coming of social media, but there were satellite TV and private weeklies, such as Shihan, which supported a change that st and spread to elsewhere started in the traditional south and spread elsewhere, before it was contained with measures that led to a democratization process, which brought an elected parliament and new liberal Press Law in 1993 (Mousa, 2012) . Agendas of political change are not effective without emphasis by major media. Social media cannot influence change alone. In reality, though the leader changed the status quo persists in Egypt, and Libya is still in chaos. Change is still in the hands of people.
An easy way to visualize this is by reference to vertical and horizontal media. Those media that aim to reach large numbers of people, regardless of their economic or social status, are vertical. Daily newspapers and local and network television, for example, are vertical in that they reach down, as if shouting from the top of one of the great Egyptian pyramids at Giza. That is the way many of us think of the power of media. By contract, in the village of Giza merchants illustrate the way ancient Papyrus Paper was created by slicing off the thick green skins of the Papyrus plants, then creating thin strips of the pulpy white interiors that can be dried and woven, Scotch-plaid like, into roles of absorbent "paper." Such paper was transportable when rolled up on scrolls. Papyrus paper emphasized messages on flat surfaces for those with special interests. Papyrus paper democratized information as would Guttenberg centuries later.
We all live in a richly mediated world, and we naturally assume that everyone is sharing a common agenda, which is true, but our access to the agenda very much depends on the media agendas we select to frame our civic, and personal, worlds. It turns out we have much more power than we realize, and many national leaders realize. Those who visualize a clear institutional world represented by the magnificently rising pyramids, have trouble realizing the world is moving toward a more personalized mix of personal messages, the ones more easily transportable by papyrus paper. What media produce has ramifications political and cultural for all of us. Social media are the horizontal media of our day. Of course magazines, long a specialized horizontal media, remain, but those mass magazines that aimed for large mass audiences-in the United States, Life, Look, Saturday Evening Post, Collier's, and many othershave been gone for decades. Newsweek is attempting a comeback after closing; U.S. News and World Report is gone; Time Magazine often struggles for circulation. U.S. magazines with large circulation, e.g. People (which has recently confronted challenges), are usually horizontal in appeal. People concentrates on some news events, especially if they involve celebrities. In other words, People is horizontal.
Other horizontal, for the most part, media include Twitter, Snapshots, Tumblr, You Tube, Facebook Google + and AreebaAreeba. These media all carry major news from time to time, but usually these media reflect major events as they occur in vertical media. All of us can think of events that emerged first on these media, then evolved to major vertical media, but, in general, the exceptions prove the rule. Vertical media, operated by professionals who orient their stories to national government, events, and audiences still set agendas, although-in a 2008 study-there is just a hint that the ability of the vertical media may be in decline. The 1972 Chapel Hill, N.C., agenda setting study found that the correlation between media and audience on the presidential election issues to be .97, almost a perfect fit. 
Figure 4: Decline of Television and Newspaper Audiences
How we use and meld media agenda communities depends on our interests and opportunities. These differ across time and space. They differ across generations. Don't expect your children to create and value the same communities as you do. They may; they may not. Indeed, they may live in personal communities, in which you may feel excluded. This is not new across generations.
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Figure 5: Media Use by Age
If we are more influenced by media when we have more interest in the agendas of valued communities, it can be argued that our individuality will surface in the way we mix, or meld, agendas. Of course, we implicitly argue that media agendas are more than a collection of news stories. Media agendas represent the saliences (Carter, 1962) of value in terms of objects (and attributes) of the communities served by those media. The objects represented by a medium reflect a community. Because most societies are urban and complex, as Lippmann argued, we have no other way to obtain a comprehensive view of a particular community. Therefore, we argue agenda communities are communities. We could drive around Amman all day, stopping to talk to dozens of people, but we would not obtain a representative picture of all the activities of Amman. But as citizens, we can access a wide variety of media agendas and commonly do so on a daily basis.
We are interested in the civic community, and we are interested in more personal community. There is evidence that we attend to various media community agendas, then meld them into a more compatible community. In a replication of the 1968 Chapel Hill agenda setting study in 2008, we tested the idea that Democrats, Republicans, and Independents-three major U.S. voter blocs-would meld agendas alike within a Voters who are interested in elections, scholar David Weaver has found, are more likely to seek information from traditional/vertical media. Weaver found that if there is high interest in an election, but low information about that election, voters have-as he put it-a high need for orientation (Weaver, 1977) . These voters are more likely to use media and absorb the media agenda than voters with either low interest or high information.
Agenda setting, therefore, starts with people and their needs and interests.
Voters/citizens also have a large selection of media, both vertical media that concentrate on facts, and horizontal media that concentrate on perspectives. Voters/citizens also have their own interests, opinion, and voting history. One can visualize these three elements in Figure 7 . Voters, we theorized in our 2008 replication study, would obtain most of their information from vertical media (here we report on evening television news) and at least some of their information from horizontal media (here we use opinion makers), fitting these two news agendas into the web of their own personal preferences and histories. Here is one important point: There is no other way to obtain information about the election, orwe argue-any other public issues. All information must come from other people, direct experience, or a mediated source. And this is a closed system. If we can account for the influence of the vertical media, then we can actually estimate the influence of horizontal media and personal experience. The sum of the total experiences equals a unity of 1.
How? We devised a formula to predict how individuals might gather into more personalized agenda communities, and then we illustrate it with actual 2008 data. The formula is:
Therefore, if the correlation between vertical media and voters was .80, then the residual, unaccounted for
Voter Vertical Media
Personal Beliefs
Horizontal Media correlation would be 1-. 80, or .20 . These values need to be squared. Therefore, ACA = 1 -(.64 + .04), or ACA = .32 Vertical and horizontal media account for about twothirds of voter choice, but the voters account for the remaining third. One might note that if the AS1 correlation were 1.00, the ACA = 1 -0 or 0. In other words, you could predict voter issues completely by reference to the media agenda. Horizontal media or personal preferences would play no role. Can you imagine such a society? Yet many people still assume that vertical media have such massive power. In the 1968 Chapel Hill agenda setting study, we found a high correlation between local media and voters in ranking the important issues, .97. We replicated this study in Chapel Hill in 2008, 40 years later, we content analyzed area media in 1968 -newspapers, television and other media -and conducted door-to-door interviews with a random sample of 100 voters (McCombs, 2014, p. 149 Because it was a panel study with distinctly different types of voters-those registering as Democrats, Republicans, or Independents-we could match the fit between these party groups with both vertical media (evening television news) and horizontal media (opinion makers). We argue that voters have three ways to obtain information: vertical media, horizontal media (including talking to other people), social media sources, and many other media sources of information, or from direct experience, from voting their voting history, values, and preferences.
We included NBC, CBS, ABC, CNN, and FOX (we also content-analyzed other media, not included in this analysis.) We focused on topics/objects, not attributes. At the same time we content analyzed a samples of news commentary from several major opinion makers in the United States, including Rush Limbaugh, Stephanie Miller, Jon Stewart, and others. Some are considered liberal and some conservative. None are neutral in perspective. We used content analysis to determine the topics over the nine-week during summer 2008 just about the time, at the end, when the Republican and Democratic conventions ratified their national candidates, John McCain and Barack Obama, who by then had secured their places via primary elections. We interviewed a panel of Democratic, Republican, and Independent voters (selected from official voter rolls of those voting in the North Carolina primary on May 6, 2008). Interviews over the same nine-week period of time ran to an hour or more. We sought to find the major issues mentioned by voters, along with their media preferences. Strictly speaking, an agenda setting study first records media content then, later, matches voter issues mentioned in a survey, while this study conducted both content analysis and interviews during the same period of time. But results of the 1968 and 2008 studies demonstrated that major vertical media still pack power. The 1968 study, as we mentioned, produced mediaaudience correlations of .97, while the 2008 correlational match-up was .87, still high.
If we use partial correlations to test our Agenda Community Attraction model, we find that democrats, Republicans and Independents meld traditional and social media agendas differently. See Figure 8 .
In our test, we found that Democrats, Republicans, and Independents did mix and meld agendas into different communities. Political party predicted differences in media use more powerfully than age and gender (which did not make much difference). Democrats related more to vertical and less to horizontal media. Republicans related more strongly to horizontal media than did Democrats and Independents, but did relate to vertical media. Independents were somewhat in the middle. This is from the actual data. Where we could measure the voter correlation with horizontal media. If we had only used the formula to predict the horizontal values as an estimate, the data show that there would have been little difference. Our test did find evidence that all voters potentially are exposed similarly to all media-here television and opinion makers-but that these voters melded agenda community differently. The process seems to be something deep in human cognition and is so intrinsic that we combine "agenda melding" into a single word, agendamelding, to illustrate the force of cognitive processing. We may be exposed to the same media, but we use media to anchor ourselves differently. Audiences are more important to agenda setting than we realize. If media tell us what to think about, audiences themselves, perhaps unconsciously, decide how they will think about media agenda communities. Audiences are not passive. Figure 9 .
One would expect that audiences would meld vertical and horizontal agendas with their own experiences differently across groups and over time. Figure 9 demonstrates the hypothetical dynamics as the correlations decline with vertical media in a given social system. It represents agendamelding and civic balance at any point in time, the balance among vertical and horizontal media and personal preferences. As vertical media agendas go up and down, so do horizontal media and personal inputs. The system is self-contained. For example, if there is an increase in the attraction of alternative community agendas there is a decline in vertical media influence. 
